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THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND FOREIGN RELATIONS
John H. Mansfield*
INTRODUCTION

The constitutional law of church and state is a subject of deep and
inexhaustible interest. It raises questions that present fundamental issues
concerning human nature and the purposes of political society. In the present
article I examine an aspect of this topic that has received little attention: the
application of the religion clauses of the first amendment to situations having
an international aspect, particularly situations involving United States activity
in foreign countries. What I have to say about this topic will be exploratory
in nature, with more questions raised than answered.
My interest in the present subject was aroused by the following sort of
case:
The American Jewish Congress and officials and members of the Congress,
who were also United States citizens and taxpayers, sued to enjoin a Saudi
Arabian-United States cooperation program on the ground that because of
the Saudi policy of discriminating against Jews, Jews would be excluded
from the program.' One plaintiff alleged that he had been denied a job with
a university consortium involved in the program because of his Jewish
religion, ancestry and identity. 2 Dismissal of the complaint was affirmed
because of lack of standing of the plaintiffs or "want of equity in the
complaint." 3
A pilot was hired in Fort Worth, Texas, to fly helicopters over a pilgrimage
route in Saudi Arabia. 4 The pilot understood that a condition of his employment was that he become a Moslem. At first he agreed, but then changed
his mind and instead filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act., The
court held that being a Moslem was a bona fide occupational qualification
6
for the job.

* John H. Mansfield, John H. Watson, Jr. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School;
A.B., LL.B., Harvard. The substance of this article was delivered as two lectures under the
auspices of the Center for Church/State Studies of the DePaul University College of Law,
March 13 and 14, 1986.
1.American Jewish Congress v. Vance, 575 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
2. Id. at 942.
3. Id. at 947; id. at 948 (McGowan, J.,concurring).
4. Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 810
(5th Cir. 1984).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1982).
6. Kern, 577 F. Supp. at 1201-02.
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A religiously-affiliated organization doing work among refugees in Thailand received United States government support. The organization, it was
said, mingled religious proselytization with humanitarian work.7 The problem
was handled administratively.'
The Islamic government of Pakistan was initially uninterested in permitting
American religiously-affiliated organizations to be involved in providing
assistance, some of it coming from the United States government, to Afghan
refugees in Pakistan. As a result of negotiations, a compromise was reached
by which a consortium of organizations was allowed to provide assistance
under highly restrictive conditions. 9
This topic is difficult to pursue because plaintiffs often have trouble
obtaining standing in cases involving the foreign relations of the United
States, and courts frequently avoid decision in these cases by invoking the
0

"political question" doctrine.' These obstacles recently led a court to affirm
the dismissal of a suit challenging the appointment of a United States

ambassador to the Vatican." Nevertheless, a substantial amount of litigation
relevant to this topic has developed in which the standing requirement and
the political question doctrine have not prevented decision. 2 Furthermore,
even though sometimes there are reasons for courts to avoid these disputes,
serious constitutional questions are presented that the political branches of
the government must decide, and to which scholarship perhaps can make a

contribution.
The problems presented by these cases are important because of the
manifold involvements of the United States abroad. Mention need only be
made of our government's support of development programs in many foreign
countries. The topic is also important because of the light it can bring to

7. B. NICHOLS, AT HoME IN No MAN'S LAND 21, 625 (forthcoming, Oxford U. Press;
pagination to 1986 manuscript).
8. Id. at 21.
9. Id. at 16, 381, 475.
10. For a recent discussion of the "political question" doctrine and a recommendation that
"we must abandon the political question doctrine in all its manifestations," see Redish, Judicial
Review and the "Political Question", 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1031, 1059-60 (1984-85).
11. Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Reagan, 786 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. American Baptist Churches v. Reagan, 107 S. Ct. 314 (1986). Dismissal
of the suit was affirmed on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing as taxpayers, citizens
or members of non-Catholic religions that arguably were disadvantaged by diplomatic recognition, and also on the ground that diplomatic recognition is a "judicially unreviewable political
decision." Id. at 201. The final part of the court's holding may embrace the proposition that
courts have no power to determine whether the political branches of government have violated
the first amendment in extending diplomatic recognition. For a discussion of when the political
question doctrine should not apply even though there is a foreign element in the case, see
Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1512-15 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated
and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985) (case remanded for reconsideration in light of events occurring since court of appeals' decision), aff'd, 788 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (dismissal of
complaint affirmed on ground controversy too attenuated to justify equitable relief).
12. See, e.g., infra notes 176-87 and accompanying text.
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domestic church-state issues. When we see ourselves as one society among
many, some very different from our own, and ponder the perspective of the
Constitution on this confrontation and interaction, we can deepen our insight
into the philosophy that underlies the Constitution. Perhaps this philosophy
endorses neither heavy-handed cultural imperialism nor complete cultural
relativism, but while insisting upon certain fundamentals, also gives recognition to the many paths by which humanity makes its way.
In pursuing the present topic, I have found it necessary to paint on a
large canvas. The challenge has been to see the subject in relation to other
subjects. Consequently, in what follows, I will discuss some things that at
first glance may not seem particularly relevant. For instance, I will begin
with a discussion of familiar domestic church-state cases. Also, I will discuss
cases that arise under provisions of the Bill of Rights other than the religion
clauses. In due course, I hope to persuade that consideration of these matters
is useful in approaching the problems we have to confront.
I.

DoMESTIC CASES

In domestic cases arising under the religion clauses, the essential question
is the extent to which American governments are permitted or required to
maintain the position in our society of the truths that make up the philosophy
of the Constitution and the extent to which they are permitted or required
to provide room for other beliefs that conflict with these truths. The answer
to this question is found by inquiry into the content of the constitutional
philosophy itself, what it asserts about human nature, about the purposes
of political society and about the value of freedom of individuals and groups.
Let us review some familiar cases for the light they can bring to the
content of the constitutional philosophy and the balance it strikes between
social unity and the freedom of individuals and groups. Later we can ask
what difference it makes if these cases arise in Kuala Lumpur rather than
in Kansas and, if it makes a difference, what truths of the constitutional
philosophy would explain that difference.
Mrs. Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, lived in Spartanburg, South
Carolina. Because of her religious beliefs she would not work on Saturday.
As a result, she could not get work in the Spartanburg area because all of
the mills in the area required Saturday work. Mrs. Sherbert applied to the
state authorities for unemployment compensation. The South Carolina administrative authorities and courts determined, however, that because of
Mrs. Sherbert's reason for not being able to get work, she was not qualified
for unemployment compensation under South Carolina law. The unemployment compensation fund, they decided, was reserved for unemployment
resulting from other causes. On review by the Supreme Court of the United
States,' 3 the Court held that the free exercise clause of the first amendment
13. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The holding of Sherbert was reaffirmed in
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987).
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entitled Mrs. Sherbert to be included in the unemployment compensation
program, even though this undermined South Carolina's policy of preserving
the unemployment fund for other purposes. Of course, South Carolina was
not required to have unemployment insurance, but so long as it had an
insurance program of the scope that it had, the program was required to
include Mrs. Sherbert. Thus, South Carolina was constitutionally required
affirmatively to help Mrs. Sherbert and other Seventh Day Adventists in the
practice of their religion.
Wisconsin v. Yoder 14 is similar to Mrs. Sherbert's. case. In Yoder, the
Supreme Court held that the free exercise clause of the first amendment
required Wisconsin to sacrifice its policy of mandatory schooling for all
children up to the age of sixteen to the Amish belief that their children
should not go to school past the eighth grade. Amish opposition to higher
schooling is an integral part of their religiously-based way of life. They are
in the sectarian tradition, which emphasizes keeping apart from the world. 5
From the point of view of modern, urban, technological society, they are a
foreign people. The Supreme Court said in Yoder that to make the Amish
send their children to school beyond the eighth grade would destroy their
way of life, implying that from the point of view of the Constitution this
would be an evil outcome.
But we know from other cases that there are limits to how far the
Constitution requires or even permits government to go in accommodating
distinctive ways of life, even those that are based on religion. A religious
belief may conflict with values of such importance under the Constitution
that a way of life founded on it need not or must not be accommodated.
Polygamy, even though based on religious belief, may be prohibited. 16 It is
interesting to note, however, that prosecutors in California overlook polygamy among the Hmong people living there. 7 The Hmong came from Laos
at the end of the Vietnam War. Perhaps it is thought that since they were
free to practice polygamy in Laos, and since we had something to do with
their coming to California, it is only right that they should be allowed to
continue in their traditional way. Do the Mormons have ground for complaint?' 8 California authorities have interfered, however, with the Hmong

14. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
15. See I E. TROELTSCH, THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES 328-43 (1981).
16. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
17. See Sherman, When Cultures Collide, 6 CAL. LAW., Jan. 1986, at 33, 35.
18. Polygamy among American Indians has been recognized by American courts and the
difference in treatment of them and Mormons noted. Cf. Bartholomew, Recognition of Polygamous Marriages in America, 13 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1022, 1060-61, 1067, 1068 n.70 (1964).
For consideration of the special status of the Indians, see infra notes 27-57 and accompanying
text.
Polygamous marriages in a foreign country have been given effect in the United States: In
In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 83 Cal. App. 2d 256, 188 P.2d 499 (1948), a Hindu married
two wives in India, moved to California leaving the wives in India, and then died intestate in
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practice of marriage by capture. 9 Perhaps as time passes and the Hmong
are assimilated to American life-if they ever are-their claim to special
treatment will lose its force.2 0 We will see that this is what happened in the
case of American Samoa. 2
The recent Supreme Court case of Estate of Thornton v. Caldor22 made
clear that there is a limit to required or permitted accommodation to religious belief. In Caldor, a Connecticut statute prohibited employers from
requiring an employee to work on his chosen Sabbath. The prohibition was
absolute and took no account of the burden on the employer or on other
employees. The Court held that the statute violated the establishment clause.
In the Bob Jones case, 23 the Court held that it did not violate the free
exercise clause to deny tax exemption to an educational institution that
because of religious belief discriminated in student admissions on the ground
of race.
The school aid cases also predominantly show the limits to how far
government must or may go in accommodating religious belief. 24 In the
recent case of Bowen v. Roy,25 an American Indian testified that his religious
beliefs would be violated if a government agency used a Social Security
number for his infant daughter, Little Bird of the Snow, in processing
applications for food stamps and benefits under a program providing aid
for families with dependent children. The Indian believed that a unique
numerical identifier would rob Little Bird of the Snow of her spirit. But the
Supreme Court held that use of the number did not violate the free exercise
clause.2
II.

INDIAN TRIBES

Reference to Bowen v. Roy allows us to move on in our inquiry from
purely domestic cases to those involving Indian tribes. Indian tribes have

California. The court held that the wives were entitled to succeed to the Hindu's estate. It
noted that the Hindu had not cohabited with the wives in California. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 446 (1982): "It may be doubted whether a foreign visitor would be permitted
to cohabit here with his four wives although even this is uncertain."
19. Sherman, supra note 17, at 33, 36, 60; see also Note, The Cultural Defense in the
Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293 (1986) (Hmong tribesman charged with felony homicide
after he executed his adulterous wife).
20. See Note, supra note 19, at 1310.
21. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
22. 105 S.Ct. 2914 (1985).
23. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
24. E.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball,
105 S.Ct. 3216 (1985).
25. 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).

26. But five Justices in Bowen seem to have agreed that benefits could not be conditioned
on the Indian providing a Social Security number if to do so would violate his religious beliefs.
Id.
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been described as "domestic dependent nations." 27 They are nations, but
not foreign nations. 28 They are nations, but only "quasi-sovereign. ' 29 Sometimes they have a special relation to particular areas of land. Perhaps they
may be thought of as having a status somewhere between the Amish and a
foreign nation: the Amish are not a nation or in any sense sovereign, nor
are they related to land other than as ordinary property owners; a foreign
nation is fully sovereign and exercises complete jurisdiction over particular
territory. Consideration of the Indian tribes and the application of the Bill
of Rights, including the religion clauses, to them and to the United States
in its relations with them, will enable us to move toward our objective of
considering cases of a purely foreign character and in the process to gain
insight into the possibility of varying applications of the religion clauses.
The Supreme Court has said that the Indian "tribes have historically been
regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority." 30 The provisions referred
to would seem to include the Bill of Rights. Thus, under one view, even the
grossest departure from due process of law by a tribal government would
not result in a violation of the Constitution. Yet, in an earlier decision, 3'
the Court said the tribes are "restrained by the general provisions of the
-12 without indicating what would be included in such
Constitution ....
''general provisions."
To say that the Constitution is not applicable to the Indian tribes assumes
that the federal government is not so involved with them that they have no
real autonomy and are in actuality mere instruments of the federal government. 3 There is no constitutional obstacle to Congress's abolishing Indian
tribal governments altogether and fully subjecting Indians to state or federal
rule, even though this might violate treaties.14 There is no constitutional
impediment, in other words, to putting the Indians on the same footing as
the Amish. Also, there is no doubt about the de facto power of the United

27. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
28. Id. at 20.
29. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978).
30. Id. at 56.
31. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
32. Id. at 384. See also In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327 (D. Alaska 1886) (thirteenth amendment
prohibits slavery among Alaska Indians).
33. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 n.7 (1978); Colliflower v. Garland,
342 F.2d 369, 379 (9th Cir. 1965):
Under these circumstances, we think that . . . [the Indian courts in the Fort Belnap
Reservation] function in part as a federal agency and in part as a tribal agency,
and that consequently it is competent for a federal court in a habeas corpus
proceeding to inquire into the legality of the detention of an Indian pursuant to an
order of an Indian court.
34. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 233, 261-62 n.378 (1984).
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States to control the Indian tribes. But the existence of these powers, in the
absence of their exercise, does not render the tribes simply instruments of
the federal government. There are forms of federal involvement with the
Indian tribes the purpose and effect of which is not to eliminate their
autonomy, but to enable them to retain or regain it"5 and to pursue their
own distinctive ways.
Are the religion clauses entirely inapplicable to the Indian tribes? Are they
applicable in part, in the sense that certain values embodied in these clauses
must be recognized by the tribes?3 6 To hold the clauses applicable to some
extent would not commit us to holding them applicable to foreign nations,
which, of course, are fully sovereign.
In a 1954 case,3 7 Protestant Indians complained that their pueblo government, which apparently favored Catholicism, refused to allow them to build
churches on pueblo land or bury their dead in the pueblo cemetery, and
refused to allow Protestant missionaries to enter the pueblo at reasonable
times. One way to describe what was happening is to say that not only had
the pueblo government established Catholicism, but it had also suppressed
the free exercise of Protestantism. The court in that case held that it had
no jurisdiction to hear the suit because the actions complained of were not
38
taken under color of "state" law.
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 196839 was the result of cases of this type.
The Act may be thought of as an assimilationist statute because it forces
Indian tribes to conform to some extent to standards applicable to the federal
and state governments. The Act applies most of the provisions of the Bill
of Rights to the tribes/h However, although it includes a free exercise clause,
it does not have a nonestablishment clause. 4' Thus, under the Indian Civil
Rights Act, some of the pueblo's actions in the case just referred to might
have been illegal but not others. However, limitations on the pueblo would
have derived entirely from the Act, not from the Constitution, unless the
religion clauses have some application to Indian tribes by virtue of the
Supreme Court's dictum, referred to above, that the "general provisions"
42
of the Constitution are applicable to the tribes.
Rights created by the Indian Civil Rights Act, including the free exercise
right, are enforceable in the federal courts only by way of habeas corpus.

35. See, e.g., Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1982).
36. See Native Am. Church of N. Am. v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134-35
(10th Cir. 1959) (religion clauses inapplicable).
37. Toledo v. Pueblo Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954).
38. As required by 42 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1982).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1982).
40. Id. at § 1302.
41. Id. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63 (1978); Hearings on the
ConstitutionalRights of the American Indian Before the ConstitutionalRights Sub-Committee
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, 221 (1965).
42. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
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Other remedies for violations of the Act must be sought from tribal authorities. The Supreme Court reached this conclusion in a case involving an
Indian woman who had married outside the tribe. Her tribe had an ordinance
that excluded from tribal membership and its benefits the children of women
who married outside the tribe, but not the children of men who married
outside the tribe. The woman and her children claimed that this ordinance
violated the equal protection clause contained in the Act. 4 3 The district court
had held that it had jurisdiction to enforce the Act, but construed the equal
protection clause in the Act not to condemn the tribal tradition of defining
tribal identity through the male line." In other words, its interpretation of
4 5
equal protection took the cultural context into account.
Does the philosophy of the Constitution embrace values that would support
the proposition that the religion clauses are not applicable to the Indian
tribes, or at least not applicable in the same way that they are to the federal
government and the states? Perhaps importance is to be attached to the
preservation of indigenous, pre-European traditions. In that case, Catholicism would not qualify. It might be thought that these indigenous, preEuropean traditions give to the Indians a sense of meaning that cannot be
supplied in any other way, and that they should have a sense of meaning is
an important human good under the Constitution. Another possibility is
that importance is to be attached to any tradition that a tribe has embraced,
even though not indigenous. Under this approach, Catholicism might qualify.
Importance would be attached simply to stability and continuity. Finally,
importance might be attached not to indigenousness or to stability and
continuity, but to autonomy and self-determination, so that whatever path
an Indian tribe chose, and regardless of when it chose it, that choice would
be respected. This last suggestion includes two further possibilities: either
importance is to be attached to the path chosen by traditional tribal authority,
or importance is to be attached to the path chosen through a process
conforming to some notion of what is fair. Thus it might be permissible for
an Indian tribe to favor a religion only if that religion was chosen by the
tribe through a process judged to be in some sense democratic.
The Indian Religious Freedom Act of 197846 has a different focus than
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. The earlier statute is concerned with
43. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
44. Id. at 54.
45. See also Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143, 1150 (D.S.D. 1974), remanded on other
grounds, 521 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1975):
The legislative history of . . . [the bill of rights in the Indian Civil Rights Act]
indicates that the scope of the individual rights contained therein is to be determined
by balancing them against the legitimate interests of the tribe in maintaining the
traditional values of their unique governmental and cultural identity.
A recent case in a court of the Yakima Indian Nation seems to have involved enforcement of
the free exercise provision of the Indian Civil Rights Act. Members of the tribe had fished out
of season, in violation of tribal regulations. They were tried to a jury in the tribal court and
acquitted on the ground that the regulations infringed the free exercise of their religion. The
defendants claimed to have acted in accordance with ancient religious custom. N.Y. Times,
Apr. 30, 1987, at A26, col. 4.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982).
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the exercise of power by tribal authorities, the later with relations between
the United States government and the Indians. The Indian Religious Freedom
Act calls upon the federal government to accommodate its programs to
Indian religious practices.4 7 Thus if a dam is to be built, efforts should be
made to protect Indian sacred sites. What is it under this statute that the
government should accommodate? Indigenous Indian religions? Religions
that have become traditional with the Indians? Religions that have been
adopted by Indian tribes through particular procedures? Whatever happens
to be the religion of a particular Indian? The statute speaks of protecting
and preserving the "traditional religions" of the American Indian. 48 Some
of the legislative history supports the view that only indigenous Indian
49
religions were intended to be protected by the statute.
One view of the Indian Religious Freedom Act is that it does nothing that
the religion clauses of the first amendment themselves do not do.5 0 The
purpose of the Act was not to give special treatment to Indian religions, but
only to cause federal officials to consider whether government programs
might adversely affect Indian religions and whether the religion clauses of
the first amendment would permit or require adjustment of the programs."

47. [I]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American
Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians,
including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects,
and freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.
Id.
48. Id.
49. The Senate committee report refers to "native traditional religions," and contrasts the
religious practices protected by the Act with those of Catholics, Protestants and Jews. S. REP.
No. 95-709, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 5 (1978). Section 2 of the Act orders the President to
direct federal departments and agencies "to evaluate their policies and procedures in consultation
with native traditional leaders in order to determine appropriate changes necessary to protect
and preserve Native American religious cultural rights and practices." Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92
Stat. 469 (1978). The Senate committee report in referring to this provision states: "It is the
intent that . . . [consultation be with] the practitioner of the religion, the medicine people,
religious leaders, and traditionalists who are Natives-not Indian experts, political leaders, or
any other nonpractitioner." S. REP. No. 95-709, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978).
Would the belief of the Indian appellee in Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986), discussed
supra in text accompanying notes 24-26, that use of a Social Security number would rob his
daughter of her spirit, qualify for protection under the Indian Religious Freedom Act? The
father testified that he had recently formed the belief as a result of conversations with a tribal
chief. Id. at 2150.
50. For what the religion clauses themselves can do, see Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 691-95 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v.
Northwest IndianCemetery Protective Ass'n, 55 U.S.L.W. 3741 (U.S. May 4, 1987) (No.
86-1013), where the court held that a Forest Service plan to permit commercial logging and the
construction of a road in a part of a national forest sacred to Indians would violate the free
exercise clause and that protection of the Indians' right would not conflict with the establishment
clause. The court cited the Indian Religious Freedom Act, but did not rest decision upon it.
Id. at 694.
51. The Senate committee report suggests that no special treatment was intended, S. REP.
No. 95-709, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 6 (1978), as do statements made during debate in the
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Another view is that the Act gives special protection to Indian religions. 2 If
it does, is this special protection consistent with the first amendment? Is a
statute constitutional that protects a sacred Indian site from inundation by
a federal dam but does not protect a site important to another religion?" 3
A recent federal court decision held it not unconstitutional for the federal
and state governments to allow the Native American Church to use peyote
4
in its ceremonies, although such use is forbidden to non-Indian religions.
"Congress has the power or duty to preserve our Native American Indians
...as a cohesive culture until such time, if ever, all of them are assimilated
in the main stream of American culture." 55 On the reasoning of this decision,
it might be permissible to give financial aid to religiously-affiliated Indian
schools even though this would be forbidden in the case of other religiously56
affiliated schools.
Indians occupied this continent before the Europeans came. They had
their own religions, culture and political organizations. They were recognized
by the European powers and subsequently by the United States as sovereign
nations. Until the middle of the last century, the United States dealt with
them by treaty.57 These facts are the basis for the view that it is constitutional
to attach special importance to Indian religions and for the federal government to give them special protection. The Constitution protects to some
extent the right of any group, such as the Amish or the Seventh Day
Adventists, to follow a distinctive, religiously-based way of life, but the
special facts of Indian history are suggested to warrant additional protection.
III.

SUPPORTING FOREIGN VALUES IN THE UNITED STATES

Let us now direct our attention to situations in which American governments act within the United States to support the values of foreign nations
and cultures even though these values may conflict with the values that

House. 124 CONG. REC. 21, 444-45 (1978). See Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2152 (1986);
Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 746 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Crow v.
Gullet, 706 F.2d 856, 858-59 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
52. This reading was suggested as possible by a representative of the Justice Department
during the hearings held by the Senate committee. S. REP. No. 95-709, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
10 (1978).
53. This constitutional concern was expressed by the representative of the Justice Department
mentioned in note 52. Also, see the debate in the House of Representatives, 124 CONG. REC.
21,446 (1978), and Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 794 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 856
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
54. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Smith, 556 F. Supp. 632, 636-40 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
55. Id. at 639. See also United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595, 597-601 (D.N.D. 1984).
56. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) (employment preference for Indians
in Bureau of Indian Affairs not violative of fifth amendment). Cf. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210
U.S. 50, 81-82 (1908) (constitutional for federal officials at direction of Indians to pay Indian
treaty and trust funds to sectarian schools).
57. See Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of FederalProtection of Indian
Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 987 (1981).
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American governments ordinarily must uphold. There are many such situations, but only a few will be discussed: cases involving discrimination in
employment in the United States by foreign companies doing business here;
extradition cases; cases involving prosecution in the United States of persons
seized abroad, or the use of evidence here that was seized abroad; and,
finally, cases involving the projection into the United States, through the
use of property located here, of foreign ideas about the proper relation
between government and religion. As in the discussion of the Indians, my
purpose is to increase awareness of the possibility of varying applications of
the religion clauses when other nations and cultures are involved.
In recent years many foreign companies have established businesses in the
United States. In some cases treaties of friendship and commerce between
the United States and the countries from which these companies come
arguably permit them to discriminate in employment in the United States.
For instance, the treaty with Japan permits "companies of either Party...
to engage, within the territories of the other Party, accountants and technical
experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their
choice ....,58The motive for such discrimination may be the efficient and
profitable operation of the business: it may be thought, for instance, that
only if Japanese run an automobile plant in Tennessee, only if it is, so to
speak, an island of Japanese culture, will the business be a success. If the
executives and supervisors are Japanese, less training may be necessary and
relations with the home office may be easier.5 9 On the other hand, the motive
may be simply to keep well paid jobs for one's own people. The motive of
the United States in entering into such treaties is to encourage foreign
investment and to gain favorable treatment for American companies doing
business abroad.
In a recent case, the Supreme Court construed the treaty of friendship
and commerce with Japan in fact not to authorize a company incorporated
in the United States that was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese
company to discriminate on the ground of nationality. 60 The question of
whether the parent company could discriminate was left undecided. But in
another case, a federal court held that the treaty with Greece permitted a
Greek company to favor Greek nationals in the upper levels of management,
though not to discriminate on the basis of national origin. 6' Neither case
discussed any constitutional issues.
The federal government, of course, is not required to prohibit discrimination in private employment at all. May it prohibit it generally, as it does

58. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
art. VIII (1), 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, at 9.
59. See Ritomsky & Jarvis, Doing Business in America: The Unfinished Work of Sumitomo
Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 193, 194 (1986).
60. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
61. Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984).
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in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 62 but exempt foreign companies? Perhaps
it is permissible to allow foreign companies to discriminate on some grounds
but not on others, on the ground of religion, for instance, but not on the
ground of race.
Suppose a company from an Islamic country wishes to start a business in
the United States and employ only Moslems at the higher levels. The company's aim is to maintain an atmosphere believed to be helpful to business
and also to strengthen Islam. American companies object on the ground that
it would be useful for them in certain circumstances to discriminate on the
basis of religion, but they are prohibited from doing so. Non-Moslems object
because they are excluded from profitable employment and because they feel
humiliated. The government, defending the treaty that permits the company
to discriminate, invokes economic and foreign policy considerations. It also
argues that implicit in the religion clauses of the first amendment is respect
for the values of foreign nations, which would include allowing foreigners
to do business in this country in their own way, especially when religion is
involved .63

In extradition cases, the United States acts in this country to help foreign
governments obtain custody of persons charged with crimes for the purpose
of prosecution and punishment. The conduct with which these persons are
charged is not always a crime in this country, and the procedure that will
be employed in their foreign prosecutions may be forbidden in the United
States. In one case it was held permissible to extradite a United States citizen
to Australia even though it was claimed that the absence of a statute of
limitations in Australia for the crime with which the defendant was charged
would violate due process in the United States.6 In another case, a court
held it permissible to return a serviceman to Germany to serve a sentence
imposed by a German court, even though the serviceman claimed that at his
65
German trial he had been deprived of important procedural protections.
Dicta in other decisions, however, suggest that there are limits to the procedures and substantive rules that the due process clause will permit the

62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
63. In United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986), the court held that a
clause in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 922, 930 (1848), providing that Mexicans
in the territory ceded to the United States would be "secured in the free exercise of their
religion without restriction," allowed Indians within the boundaries of a pueblo to take eagles
for religious use, and that nothing in the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §
668 (1982), which prohibits the taking of bald and golden eagles generally, abrogated this
privilege. But see United States v. Dion, 106 S. Ct. 2216, 2219 n.3, 2224 (1986) (holding that
the Eagle Protection Act did abrogate rights under an Indian treaty to hunt bald eagles. In
that case, no religious freedom claim was considered).
64. Kamrin v. United States, 725 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984).
65. Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972). See also
United States v. Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976 (D. Vt. 1979) (foreign government allegedly breached
plea bargain).
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United States, through extradition, to support. One court spoke of procedures antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency.M
The remarkable Mexican prisoner transfer case67 is another example of the
United States acting in this country in a way that supports values that are
in a sense alien to the Constitution. Under a treaty with Mexico, American
citizens convicted in Mexico of crimes committed there and serving sentences
in Mexican jails were transferred to United States prisons to complete their
sentences. To be eligible for transfer, the prisoners had to agree not to attack
their Mexican convictions in United States courts. Nevertheless, once they
were in the United States, some of the prisoners did attack their convictions
in American courts on the ground of a deprivation of due process in Mexico.
The Second Circuit dismissed petitions for habeas corpus in these cases,
saying that it did not violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment
to hold the prisoners to their bargains. The court stressed the interest of
Americans still in Mexican jails, whose chance of transfer would be jeopardized if the treaty with Mexico was not observed, and the interest of the
United States in good relations with Mexico. 6 Of course, such considerations
would not allow the United States to agree to whatever conditions the
Mexicans might require, even if the result was that no prisoners would be
transferred. For instance, the United States could not agree to continue in
this country abusive treatment to which the prisoners had been subjected in
69
Mexican jails.
The foreign abduction cases also test how far it is permissible for an American
government to go in supporting foreign values in this country. In these cases,
foreign officials, by means that would be illegal in the United States, seize
a person and hand him over to American authorities for prosecution in the

66. United States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1974). See also
Neeley v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1901) (court stated that inability to assert a defense
would be one situation where the court would inquire into the internal legal procedures that
await the relator upon extradition).
67. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the background
to the United States-Mexico Prisoner Transfer Treaty and cases dealing with the problems
presented by it, see Dalton, United States Treaties on the Execution of Penal Sentences, in
INTERNATIoNAL

ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCING UNITED STATES LAW IN THE WORLD

COMMUNITY 179 (R. Lillich ed. 1981).
68. 621 F.2d at 1198-1201.
69. See also Cooley v. Weinberger, 518 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1975), in which the denial of
survivor's Social Security benefits on the ground that the claimant had been convicted in Iran
of murdering the wage earner, her husband, was affirmed:
[Tlhe administrative law judge found, in effect, that the procedure followed in Iran
was not "so shocking to the forum community that it cannot be countenanced."
We think there is substantial evidence to support this finding and we are not inclined
to disturb it . . . . The fact that Iranian procedures may not be consistent with due
process protections guaranteed in United States criminal proceedings will not in
itself prevent effect being given a judgment rendered in Iran in accord with Iranian
Law.
Id. at 1155.
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United States. In prosecuting the defendant, the United States to an extent
supports what was done in the foreign country. Dismissal of the prosecution
might have some deterrent effect on the conduct of foreign officials. Nevertheless, it is generally held that prosecution under these circumstances does
not violate the fourth or the fifth amendment. 70 On the other hand, if
American agents were involved in the abduction, prosecution may be barred,
and it may be barred even if the defendant is an alien.7 Some courts say
that the conduct of the American agents must have been "shocking" or
"outrageous." 72
When evidence was obtained abroad by agents of a foreign government
by methods that would violate the fourth amendment in the United States,
it is generally held that there is no obstacle to the use of the evidence in
prosecutions in this country.7 3 On the other hand, if American agents par74
ticipated in the seizure, the evidence will be excluded.
With these suggestive fragments of law as background, let us now turn to
a famous dispute over church property, which also involved the projection
into the United States of values in a sense alien to the Constitution. In
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 75 a decision handed down by the Supreme
Court in 1952, a dispute arose over the right to use St. Nicholas Russian
Orthodox Cathedral in the City of New York. The dispute was between the
appointee of the Patriarch of Moscow to be archbishop in New York and
an American group which claimed that the appointment of the archbishop
was void because the Patriarch was under the domination of the Soviet
government. The United States Supreme Court overruled the New York
legislature and courts, which had sustained the claim of the American group,

70. E.g., United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975).
71. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280-81 (2d Cir. 1974). In Toscanino, the
court decided that the holdings of Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), and Frisbie v. Collins,
342 U.S. 519 (1952), allowing prosecution, had been eroded. Id. at 275. But see Stephan,
Constitutional Limits on International Rendition of Criminal Suspects, in INTERNATIONAL
ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCING UNITED STATES LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY

61 (R.

Lillich ed. 1981) (asserting that Ker-Frisbie is still good law).
72. United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1001 (1975). But see Di Lorenzo v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 79, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(although this may be required to dismiss an indictment, in an action for damages against
United States agents, it may be enough that there was a "forcible abduction").
73. See, e.g., United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 269-71 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139-40 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Jordan, I M.J. 334, 24 C.M.A. 156 (1976). The court in Morrow, however, stated
that if the methods used by the agents of the foreign government "shocked the judicial
conscience," the evidence ought to be excluded by a federal court inan exercise of its supervisory
power. 537 F.2d at 139.
74. Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 639-40 (D.C. Cir. 1966). For a discussion of what
sort of participation by American agents will result in exclusion, see Note, The Applicability
of the Exclusionary Rule in Federal Court to Evidence Seized and Confessions Obtained in
Foreign Countries, 16

COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 495, 502-10 (1977).

75. 344 U.S. 94 (1952). See also Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
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and held that the free exercise clause of the first amendment required New
York to uphold the Patriarch's appointee's right to control the cathedral.
The Court said that in a hierarchical church, including one of an international
character, deference must be paid to the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical
authority. The Court's ruling in favor of the Patriarch's appointee was all
the more striking because it came at the height of the Cold War.
One way of stating the question presented by the Kedroff case is what
relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet government
would have been acceptable to the donors who contributed money to build
St. Nicholas Cathedral. A possible implication of the Supreme Court's
decision is that the donors would not have objected to the relations that
existed between the church and the Soviet government after World War II,
even though they involved substantial domination by the government, at
least when the alternatives to allowing the property to be enjoyed by a
church thus dominated were to give it to an American group that disclaimed
all allegiance to the Patriarch or to have the trust entirely fail. Since the
donors would not have disapproved of domination of the church by the
Soviet government, New York was bound by the first amendment to enforce
their wishes and uphold the right of the Patriarch's appointee to control the
cathedral, and not to give the trust property to those who held a different
view of the proper relations between a Christian church and the state. The
Kedroff decision seems to mean that the free exercise clause entitles donors
in the United States to spend their money to support a religion, one of
whose characteristics is that it permits a foreign government to perform a
function in regard to religion that no American government is allowed to
perform-except possibly an Indian tribal government. An American Anglican has a right under the first amendment to give his property to support
the Anglican Church in the United States, even though the Queen is the
Supreme Governor of that church and Parliament regulates it extensively.
An American Catholic has a right to give his property to support the Catholic
Church in the United States, even though the Holy See is recognized as a
person under general international law, and the Pope is the ruler of the State
76
of the City of the Vatican.

76. See Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in International Law, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 308
(1952).
In Noe v. FCC, 260 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 924 (1959), it was
contended that the award of a television license to Loyola University in New Orleans violated
the Federal Communications Act because the University, although a Louisiana corporation,
was controlled by the Society of Jesus, an organization that had its headquarters in Rome and
whose highest governing authorities were aliens. The court held that the provisions relied on in
the Act did not cover Loyola's case, but were directed at situations in which there was a threat
to national security and the actuality of alien control, not its mere possibility. The court also
rejected an argument that since Loyola was an "instrumentality of the Holy Roman Pontificate,"
a foreign sovereign, it was against the public policy and adverse to the sovereignty of the
United States to award it a television license. Id. at 743. Possible constitutional objections to
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In the course of the Kedroff litigation, the New York Court of Appeals
stated, somewhat petulantly:
The First Amendment would nullify identification of a church with the
Government of the United States or a State. We do not understand on
what principle it is supposed to sanctify the identification of a church with
a foreign State .... There can hardly be a constitutional mandate requiring that foreign States shall be allowed to administer churches in the
United States .... It would be strange if our fundamental law, while
ordering the separation of church and State, were so awkward an instrument that in functioning it has to produce an opposite result from that at
which it aims."
The error of the New York court was in supposing that because the
Constitution requires American governments not to interfere in religious
affairs, it lays down the same rule for foreign governments.7 s To the contrary,
the Supreme Court held in Kedroff, not only is this not so, but the free
exercise clause obligates New York, through its law of trusts, to aid American
donors who do not believe in the separation of church and state to give
expression to their beliefs through the dedication of property in the United
States. Of course, if an American donor wants his money to be used to
support a church connected with an American government, he cannot have
that.
In Kedroff, the donors were probably residents of the United States who
gave money to support a religion of a particular sort by a decision that was
free from coercion by any government. Suppose, however, that the funds
used to build St. Nicholas Cathedral came from the Soviet Union, and indeed
indirectly from the Soviet government. In fact, in the Kedroff case it is
stated that the Russian Orthodox Church did receive subsidies from the
Soviet government.7 9 Or suppose the Iranian government taxes all residents
of Iran for the support of Shiite Islam, and some of the proceeds of this
tax are sent to New York for the construction of a mosque there. Must New
York protect the religious dedication of this property in the same way that
it must protect trusts created by the free choice of domestic donors? Religious

prohibiting foreign influence on the means of communication in the United States were not
discussed. Cf. Kotohira Jinsha v. McGrath, 90 F. Supp. 892 (D. Hawaii 1950) (first amendment
violated by vesting in Custodian of Enemy Property a Shinto shrine in Hawaii owned by
Hawaiian corporation, a majority of whose members were aliens, when corporation not controlled by or acting for Japan).
77. St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kreshik, 7 N.Y.2d 191, 217-18, 164 N.E.2d 687, 701 (1959).
78. Cf. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring), a
decision holding it violative of a United States addressee's first amendment rights to require
him, in order to receive mail classified by the Post Office as "communist political propaganda,"
to request it in writing: "That the governments which originate this propaganda themselves
have no equivalent guarantee only highlights the cherished values of our constitutional framework; it can never justify emulating the practice of restrictive regimes in the name of expediency." Id. at 310.
79. St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kreshik, 7 N.Y.2d 191, 212, 164 N.E.2d 687, 698 (1959).
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organizations in the United States will complain that they are unfairly
competed against by religious organizations supported by foreign governments. But the complaining organizations are free to seek the support of
foreign governments for themselves. The judgment of the Constitution on
the use of foreign taxes to support religion in the United States, however,
may be different from its judgment on more severe burdens on religious
liberty imposed by foreign governments.
IV.

THE RELIGION CLAUSES AND IMMIGRATION

New York must recognize the right of the Patriarch's appointee to control
St. Nicholas Cathedral and perhaps allow tax funds raised abroad to be used
to support his activities in New York. Nevertheless, these obligations can be
rendered meaningless if the United States may keep the Patriarch's appointee
from getting to New York in the first place, or prohibit him from bringing
assets into the country to support his work here, because it disapproves of
the Patriarch's relations with the Soviet government. The importance of this
aspect of the problem can hardly be overstated. Some religions are limited
mainly to a particular country, and to cut them off from international
contact will not significantly impair their ability to fulfill their missions.
Other religions-Catholicism is an example-hold that an important part of
their religious meaning lies in their international character. Local branches
receive support and direction from abroad and in turn send forth their own
influences. The United Nations has announced a right of international
religious contact.8 0 Nevertheless, numerous examples can be given, both
historical and contemporary, of governments' efforts to cut religions off
from international contact and make them exclusively agencies of national
policy."' In his concurring opinion in the Kedroff case, Justice Frankfurter
cited the example of Bismark's Kulturkampf in the nineteenth century. 2

80. "[Subject to certain provisions] . . . the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion
or belief shall include, inter alia, the following freedoms: ... to establish and maintain
communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion or belief at national
and international levels." GENERAL ASSEMBLY DECLARATION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS
OF INTOLERANCE AND OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RELIGION OR BELIEF, G.A. Res. 36/55, 36
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982). For the discussions preceding
the adoption of this provision, see Neff, An Evolving InternationalNorm of Religious Freedom,
7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 543, 565-70 (1977).

A decision of the European Commission of Human Rights implies that Article 9 of the
European Convention of Human Rights, which provides protection for "freedom of thought,
conscience and religion," would be violated if a state expelled an alien who was the leader of
a religious group if the purpose was to "stifle the spreading of a religion" or "remove the
source of an unwanted faith and dismantle the group of his followers." Application No. 8118/
77, Dec. and Rep. Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts. 105-18 (1981).
81. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1984, § 1, at 20, col. 1 (Chinese Catholics may only worship
in "Patriotic Church" run by priests who have rejected papal authority).
82. 344 U.S. at 124 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Third World countries are sometimes unhappy with international religious
contacts, because they find them an obstacle to "nation building."
There is no clear authority on the question of the government's power to
exclude people from this country on the ground of religion or to exclude
them when the result would be a serious burden on religion. At the end of
the last century the government sought to enforce a statutory penalty against
a New York Presbyterian church for entering into a contract with a minister
in Scotland to come to New York to serve as the church's pastor. But the
Supreme Court interpreted the statute, which forbade making contracts with
aliens who were abroad for employment in the United States, not to extend
to contracts for what the Court called "toil .. .of the brain." 3 The Court

said it could not believe that Congress intended to exclude from the country
ministers of religion in view of the Christian or at least religious character
4
of the country.1
In a concurring opinion in a deportation case,"5 Justice Frankfurter shocked
some by saying that the political branches of the government were free to
keep people out of the country on any ground they liked, including antiSemitism and anti-Catholicism. In another case, 6 Justice Douglas asked, in
reaction to broad assertions of Congress's power over immigration, whether
it really could be the case that Congress may exclude someone from the
country because he holds a certain belief about Christ. In Kedroff, the State
Department in fact had excluded the Patriarch's appointee, at least for a
7
time.1
It is clear from Supreme Court decisions that the political branches of the
government may exclude aliens from the country or deport them for reasons
that would be unacceptable as a basis for other governmental actions. Long
ago the Court said that Congress could exclude people because of their race
or national origin.88 In 1977, the Court upheld a provision of the immigration
law that facilitates the reunion of illegitimate children with their mothers

83. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463 (1892).
84. Id. at 464-72.
85. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
86. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 772 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and
Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 863 (1987); Comment, Immigration and the First
Amendment, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1922 (1985).
87. 344 U.S. at 97.
88. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706 (1893); Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). But see Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 2992, 3012 (1985) (Holding that
since statutes and regulations prohibit discrimination on grounds of race or national origin in
granting or denying parole to aliens pending decision whether to admit them into the United
States, the court of appeals should not have reached the question whether such discrimination
violates the fifth amendment. But Justice Marshall, dissenting, joined by Justice Brennan,
reached the constitutional question and concluded that the government could not discriminate
on grounds of race or national origin, at least in the absence of "reasons closely related to
immigration concerns.").
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but not with their fathers, s9 a distinction that the equal protection clause
would not permit in regard to other matters.
The United States is a sovereign nation and, it is said, sovereignty carries
with it an absolute right to exclude ° The question is clouded, however, by
the fact that judicial pronouncements sometimes do not make clear whether
there are few or no limits on Congress's power to exclude, or only that there
is no judicial power, or almost no judicial power, to enforce whatever limits
there may be.
In 1972, in Kleindienst v. Mandel,91 the Supreme Court upheld the government's right to deny a visitor's visa to a Belgian Marxist sociologist who
had been invited to lecture in the United States by various scholars and
academic institutions. The Court said that the Attorney General had given
a "facially legitimate and bona fide" reason for denying the visa, namely,
92
that on an earlier visit the sociologist had violated the terms of his visa.
The implication of the Court's holding was that there could be illegitimate
reasons for denying a visa, although judicial power to go behind proffered
reasons might be limited. 93 Whatever first amendment rights needed consideration, the Court emphasized, they were not the sociologist's but those of
people in the United States who wanted to hear him. It should be added,
however, that the fact that an alien outside the United States has no right
to enter, if it is a fact, 94 does not mean necessarily that he has no rights at
all under the Constitution. The question of whether he has rights under the
Constitution, including rights under the religion clauses, will be discussed
shortly.
In contrast to immigration, there are no judicial statements about an
unlimited governmental power to exclude information that originates outside
the country, such as mail or electronic transmissions, including information
important to religion. To the contrary, such decisions as there are emphasize

89. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). One authority in discussing this decision observes:
"The apparent thrust of the Court's suggestion is that the 'limited judicial review' might be
invoked at the behest of an appropriate party to challenge the most blatant type of discrimination, for example, exclusions based solely on religion or race." I C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 2-18 (Supp. April 1986).
90. For a description of this point of view, see Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration
Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1984).
91. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
92. Id. at 770.
93. See also NGO Committee on Disarmament v. Haig, No. 82 Civ. 3636 (S.D.N.Y. June
10, 1982) (court stated that under the Mandel decision, it is limited to deciding whether the
reasons furnished by the government are facially legitimate and bona fide), aff'd, 697 F.2d 294
(2d Cir. 1982); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (remanding to district court
for development of evidence and reconsideration of statutory questions; constitutional issues
not reached), aff'd by an equally divided Court 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987); Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political Dissidents, 100 HARV. L. REV. 930 (1987).
94. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953).
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a protected first amendment right to receive information. 9 At the same time,
it may be constitutionally permissible indirectly to burden the importation
and distribution of information from abroad under statutes like the Foreign
Agents Registration Act9 and the Trading with the Enemy Act. 97
V.

THE RELIGION CLAUSES IN THE TERRITORIES

The issue of whether the Bill of Rights applies to the territories and other
areas having a special political connection with the United States has long
been a challenging topic in our constitutional law. Here, as with the Indian
tribes, we have a situation somewhere between purely domestic cases and
purely foreign cases. The issue arose early in our national history, as the
United States expanded across the continent and acquired areas formerly
under the jurisdiction of France, Spain and Mexico. 98 But it was the territorial
acquisitions of the Spanish-American War-the Philippines and Puerto Ricothat thrust the problem forward in such a manner that it was widely
understood to involve a great issue of national meaning. Extending our rule
beyond the North American continent gave us power over large numbers of
people who were formed into distinct communities with their own religion,

95. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Williams v. Blount, 314 F. Supp.
1356 (D.D.C. 1970) (summary procedure for determining whether material sent from abroad
unmailable violated fifth amendment's due process requirement). See also United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 623-24 (1977) (scope of first amendment right regarding incoming
international mail not decided).
96. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1982). The Foreign Agents Registration Act requires an agent of
a foreign principal who distributes "political propaganda" in the United States to register with
the Department of Justice, provide a copy of the material he intends to distribute and
information concerning its distribution, and attach to the material he distributes information
identifying its source. "Political propaganda" is defined by the Act to include any material
designed to influence people regarding specified subjects, such as the foreign policy of the
United States. In Meese v. Keene, 107 S.Ct. 1862 (1987), the Court held that the use in the
Act of the term "political propaganda" did not violate the first amendment rights of a California
legislator who wished to exhibit certain Canadian films found by the Justice Department to be
"political propaganda." In reaching this result, the Court relied upon the broad, nonpejorative
definition of "political propaganda" contained in the Act, the lack of a sufficient showing that
public perceptions concerning the meaning of the word "propaganda" have had an adverse
impact on the distribution of materials covered by the Act, and the opportunity those who
distribute such materials have to counteract the effect of registration under the Act by explaining
to their audiences the integrity and persuasiveness of the materials they distribute. See also
Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1313 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3335 (1986). There is a
pending prosecution of a Michigan newspaper publisher for failing to register under the Foreign
Agents Registration Act. He is claimed to have acted as an agent of the South African
government. United States v. McGoff, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1986, at 7, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May
19, 1987, at A28, col. 1.
97. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1982). See also 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201, 500.204, 500.536 appendix,
500.550, 500.562 (1985).
98. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 251-57 (1901).

1986] RELIGION CLAUSES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

21

laws and customs. The Indians could be ignored, perhaps, because their
numbers were small and their culture considered primitive, but this was not
possible with the new possessions. The path that history had given to the
peoples of these areas was not ours, but it commanded respect nevertheless.
In what are called the Insular Cases,99 the Supreme Court came to grips
with this great question of national meaning. The struggle was between two
sharply contrasting views. One view was that the extension of American rule
beyond the North American continent was a valuable achievement, and that
to require that all constitutional provisions applicable in the United States
should also apply in the new possessions would impede this process and at
the same time do an injustice to the peoples of these areas. Only if a
constitutional provision was in some sense fundamental should it apply. ' °
The other view was that although the elimination of traditional practices in
the newly acquired territories might from a certain point of view be unfortunate, this evil was far outweighed by the evil of our exercising power over
people who were not full members of our political community with the same
rights as other members. If we were unwilling to extend equal rights to the
peoples of the new territories, we should not enter into a political relationship
with them at all, but forego imperial dreams. 0' The first Justice Harlan held
this view so strongly that he was willing to see the people of Mindanao
starve if that was the consequence of holding that the Philippines were part
of the United States for the purpose of the clause in the Constitution which
requires that duties be "uniform throughout the United States."' 0 2 Speaking
generally, the first view I have just described prevailed in the Insular Cases:
all the provisions of the Bill of Rights do not necessarily apply to the
territories. 103

I have referred broadly to "the territories," but of course there are a
variety of legal relations to take into account. There are "incorporated"
4
and "unincorporated" territories: Alaska was an incorporated territory;'0
American Samoa is an unincorporated territory. 05 Micronesia is a United

99. Among which are Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 1 (1901); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904). See generally Leibowitz, United
States Federalism: The States and the Territories, 28 Am. U.L. REV. 449 (1979).
100. See generally the opinions of Justices Brown and White in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244 (1901). On the matter of fundamentals, see id. at 268, 294-96. See also Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 313 (1922).
101. See generally Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (Fuller and Harlan, J.J., dissenting).
For a description of the two points of view, see Laughlin, The Application of the Constitution
in United States Territories:American Samoa, A Case Study, 2 U. HAWAII L. REV. 337, 345
(1980-81).
102. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 385 (1901) (Harlan, J.,dissenting). The clause referred
to is U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.1.
103. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922).
104. See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
105. See Laughlin, supra note 101, at 362.
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Nations Trust Territory. It has been subdivided into four entities: the Northern Marianas, which are presently being transformed into a commonwealth
in political union with the United States, the Republic of the Marshall Islands
and the Federated States of Micronesia, with both of which Compacts of
Free Association with the United States have been initialed, and the Republic
10 6
of Palau, with which a Compact of Free Association has been signed.
Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth under United States sovereignty, an arrangement set forth in a compact between Puerto Rico and the
United States." ' Our presence in Berlin has been described as a 'protective
occupation' of a friendly and allied people." 0 It is correct to infer, especially
from the Berlin example, that there is not a sharp line between the present
topic and the question of the Bill of Rights in foreign countries. Considerations relevant to the application of the Bill of Rights in areas with which
we have some special political connection may also be present when the
United States acts in foreign countries.
Once it was accepted that the Bill of Rights did not necessarily apply to
the new territories in the same way that it did at home, difficult questions
arose. First of all, should different importance be attached to different
provisions of the Bill of Rights? Did the same importance attach to jury
trial as to the search and seizure provision of the fourth amendment? To
the religion clauses as to the guarantee of free speech? It seemed odd that
certain guarantees of the Bill of Rights might be required in the territories,
but not even the rudiments of self-government. 109 Secondly, how great a
value did the Constitution place upon allowing the peoples of the new
territories to live in accordance with their own ways? This question, as we
have seen in the case of the Indian tribes, led to other questions: Did the
Constitution find value in tradition or simply in whatever another people
happened from time to time to choose for their way? If it was simply selfdetermination that was valued, what procedure for self-determination would
be respected?
The question of the right to jury trial in the territories has been the subject
of considerable litigation. Jury trial was held not required in Puerto Rico," 0
the Philippines,"' and recently in the Marianas.' 2 It was required, however,

106. For a statement of the status of these areas, see Juda v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 441,
444 (1984). As to the Northern Marianas, see Commonwealth of N. Mar. I. v. Atalig, 723
F.2d 682 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1244 (1984). As to Micronesia, see Ralpho v. Bell,
569 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
107. The status of Puerto Rico is described in Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426
U.S. 572, 593 (1976).
108. United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 245 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979).
109. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 299 (1901) (White, J., concurring).
110. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
111. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
112. Commonwealth of N. Mar. 1. v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 647 U.S.
1244 (1984).
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in Alaska when Alaska was a territory." 3' Under certain circumstances, jury
trial can be a vehicle for upholding local ways. But in other circumstances
it is a means for their destruction, because it is inconsistent with traditional
authority and traditional methods of settling disputes. Whether jury trial is
required in American Samoa has been the subject of interesting litigation.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that jury trial was
required in Samoa unless "impractical or anomalous." 1 4 After investigation,
the district court concluded that traditional Samoan culture had so broken
down under the impact of modern values-possibly beginning with the
introduction by the United States during World War II of a wage economythat jury trial would no longer be anomalous or in conflict with Samoan
values. There really was nothing much left of the Samoan tradition to
protect." 5
Each provision of the Bill of Rights needs to be considered both from the
point of view of the importance of the right and from the point of view of
conflict with local customs. The Supreme Court has said that the free speech
provision applies to Puerto Rico."16 It has not decided whether the search
and seizure provision of the fourth amendment does." 7 The equal protection
clause has been held applicable to Puerto Rico in certain respects." 8 It may
be permissible, however, for Puerto Rico to support certain traditional
values-for instance those regarding the role of women-that a state would
not be permitted to support. The United States Claims Court has recently
held that the taking clause of the fifth amendment is applicable to Bikini in
the Marshall Islands, though the inhabitants, who were removed from the
atoll for the testing of atomic bombs, are not United States citizens. 19
Let us now consider the applicability of the religion clauses to the terri20
tories. In the 1879 Mormon polygamy case of Reynolds v. United States,
the Supreme Court stated that the free exercise clause was applicable to the
territories.12' In another case a few years later, the Court said in dictum that
whenever there is a cession of territory to the United States, the laws of the
territory that are in conflict with the political character and institutions of
the new government are displaced. The Court mentioned as among those
that would be displaced laws supporting an established religion. 22 Of course,

113. Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
114. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
115. King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1977).
116. Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986). See also
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 314 (1922).
117. See Torres v. Porto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979).
118. Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
119. Juda v. United States, 6 CI. Ct. 441, 458 (1984).
120. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
121. Id. at 162.
122. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546 (1885), quoted in Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 298 (1901) (White, J., concurring).
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at the time of these statements, the Court had before it only instances of
territories in the continental United States.
When President McKinley gave instructions to a commission that was sent
out to set up a government for the Philippines, he said that although the
customs of the people should be respected, they must be made to understand
that "certain great principles of government which have been made the basis
of our governmental system, and which we deem essential to the rule of law
and the maintenance of individual freedom" must be established and maintained in their islands. He included among those principles that must be
maintained both the free exercise of religion and the nonestablishment of
religion. 123 The President's instructions became the basis for a bill of rights
for the Philippines that was adopted by Congress and that included both
124
free exercise and nonestablishment provisions.
In some United States territories, religion is or was the basis for the
people's way of life, just as it is for the Indians and the Amish. Samoa,
perhaps, is an example.' 25 Is it permissible in these territories for a local
government, operating along traditional lines or otherwise, to promote a
particular religion, possibly to the disadvantage of minorities? May people
and influences not properly excluded from the United States on religious
grounds 26 nevertheless be excluded from these territories by local governments in order to protect the traditional religious culture? Here questions
of the sort addressed by the Indian Civil Rights Act, discussed earlier, 27 are
presented. How should the federal government act in regard to the religious
element in the local culture? May it promote and protect it? These are
2
questions of the sort presented by the Indian Religious Freedom Act.
Perhaps the free exercise clause applies to the territories, but not the
establishment clause, a suggestion that used to be made in regard to the
states before Everson v. Board of Education'29 applied the establishment
clause to them. Underlying this suggestion would be the notion that there is
a value of religious liberty protected by the first amendment that must not
under any circumstances be impaired. Beyond this core, accommodation in
the territories to particular cultures is permissible. However, it needs to be
determined how this suggestion would work out in concrete cases, and the
effort to work it out might show that the distinction we seek is not neatly
matched with the two religion clauses.

123.
United
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Public Laws and Resolutions of Philippine Com. 6-9 (April 7, 1900). See Kepner v.
States, 195 U.S. 100, 122-23 (1904).
32 Stat. 691, 693 (1901). See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 122-24 (1904).
See generally Laughlin, supra note 101.
See supra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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THE RELIGION CLAUSES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

I turn now to the question of the religion clauses in foreign countries.
From our inquiries so far we must be prepared to find this a difficult
question. It seems clear that we should not approach it either as unrestrained
zealots for "human rights" or as thorough-going cultural relativists. The
problem is too complicated and the competing values too closely balanced
for these attitudes to be useful.
In earlier parts of the discussion I have suggested that in measuring the
actions of government against the requirements of the first amendment,
respect should be shown to the ways of others. In purely domestic cases this
value has weight and, as we have seen, it also has weight when the government
deals with the Indian tribes and with areas of the world having a special
political connection with the United States.
The argument that respect is due to the ways of others is especially strong
in the case of foreign nations. The Constitution recognizes the existence of
foreign nations and, implicitly, their right to be different from the United
States. An argument can be based on this recognition that when the United
States acts abroad, the constitutionality of its actions should be judged
differently than when it acts at home. Not that the Constitution is inapplicable abroad, but that in its application abroad, in part because of the
exigencies of the foreign situation and in part because of respect for the
right of foreign nations to follow their own ways, a different judgment on
the government's conduct may result than when the government acts at
home.
Ordinarily the law of a foreign nation will express the way of another
people to which, under the Constitution, respect should be given. It follows
that if the actions of the United States in a foreign nation are proper under
the laws of that nation, this may be relevant to whether they are proper
under the Constitution of the United States. In one of the abduction cases
referred to earlier, in which a person was seized abroad and brought to the
United States for trial, the court suggested that the status of the seizure
under foreign law might be relevant to the constitutionality of prosecuting
the person in the United States. 30 In a recent case involving the seizure by
the United States Army of a ranch owned by an American in Honduras,
the court touched upon the question whether the legality of the seizure under
Honduran law was relevant to its validity under the fifth amendment.'
Decisions in nonconstitutional areas of law point in the same direction: in
the antitrust field, for instance, whether conduct violated the law of the

130. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280-81 (2d Cir. 1974). But see United States
v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 71-72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975) (United States government
has no obligation to enforce an asserted right under Chilean law).
131. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1542 (D.C. CIr. 1984) (en banc),
105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985) (case remanded for reconsideration in light of events occurring since
court of appeals' decision), aff'd, 788 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (dismissal of complaint affirmed on ground controversy too attenuated to justify equitable relief).
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country in which it took place is one consideration in deciding whether it
32
1
violated United States law.

There are limits, however, to the extent to which the laws of a foreign
country will determine the constitutionality of the actions of the United
States abroad. The laws of a particular foreign country may reflect sheer
power and not rest upon any tradition or process that from the point of
view of the Constitution is capable of achieving human good. In these
circumstances United States actions abroad should find no shelter under
foreign law. Furthermore, the laws of a foreign country may so totally
disregard the rights of internal minorities to their own culture that participation by the United States in the policy of the foreign government should
be constitutionally condemned.
When the United States has acted in a foreign country not out of respect
for the ways of that country, but for its own purposes alone, perhaps it
should not be able to invoke the value of such respect in justification of its
departure from domestically applicable standards. An example is Reid v.
Covert.' The question in that case was whether an American military
dependent who allegedly had murdered her husband on a United States base
in Great Britain could be court-martialed or was entitled to a jury trial. The
military authorities wanted to court-martial her: not out of respect for the
laws and customs of Great Britain, but to satisfy perceived American military
needs in a foreign setting. The choice was between two American systems
of justice, not between an American system and a foreign one. The Supreme
Court held that the defendant was entitled to a jury.
The remarkable Berlin hijackers case 3 4 has something in common with
Reid. In that case an American judge sitting as the United States Court for
Berlin ruled that Polish nationals who were being prosecuted for hijacking
an airplane to the United States zone of Berlin were constitutionally entitled
to a jury trial. A jury of Berliners was in fact empanelled and convicted the
defendants.' The alternative that the American occupation authorities proposed-trial to the judge-was not based upon foreign law or custom, but
upon the perceived military and foreign relations needs of the United States.
The underlying justification for the court's decision that the sixth amendment

132. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 1977);
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294-98 (3d Cir. 1979). See also
Banco Nat'l de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (interpreting the Act of State Doctrine,
which prohibits review by American courts of governmental acts of a foreign sovereign committed in the sovereign's own territory); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602611 (1982); Note, Foreign Sovereign Compulsion in American Anti-Trust Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 131 (1980-81) (discussing the defense of foreign sovereign compulsion, which gives private
persons and entities a defense to liability under United States laws when unlawful conduct is
compelled by a foreign sovereign).
133. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
134. United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979).
135. See Dostal v. Haig, 652 F.2d 173, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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applied was that when the alternatives are two American systems of justice,
unless there are imperative needs, the one with deep roots in our history and
democratic values should be employed.
The court in the Berlin hijackers case noted that jury trial might not have
been required if the United States had not asserted jurisdiction, but had6

3
turned the defendants over to the local German authorities for prosecution.
This suggestion accords with a Supreme Court decision that it did not violate
the Constitution to turn an American serviceman over to Japanese authorities
37
for trial under Japanese procedure for killing a Japanese civilian.
There is another general question that needs to be discussed. It has to do
with the relative status under the Constitution of aliens outside the United
States and United States citizens outside the United States. It has sometimes
been said that aliens outside the United States have no rights under the
Constitution, and various reasons have been given why this should be so.
One reason given is that the Constitution is a compact among a particular
people and aliens are not parties to that compact. 3 ' However, there is
substantial and growing support for the view that aliens outside the United
States do have rights under the Constitution. In the first place, there is no
language in the Bill of Rights restricting its protection to citizens. The fifth
amendment, for instance, provides simply that "no person shall be ...
" The
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ..
first amendment is framed as a set of prohibitions on what Congress may
do: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
Aliens in the United States
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ,,"19
have constitutional rights, and the number of such rights receiving judicial
recognition has steadily grown. 40 As noted earlier, nonresident aliens brought
to the United States for prosecution sometimes succeed in having their
prosecutions dismissed or evidence against them excluded because of what
was done to them abroad by United States agents.' 4' It has long been
constitutional protection
recognized that aliens outside the United States have
4 2
for their property located in the United States.'
In a recent case, an alien whose bank account in Switzerland had been
seized as the result of a letter written to Swiss authorities by the Attorney

136. 86 F.R.D. at 249.
137. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
138. See Henkin, The Constitutionas Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad
and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 31 (1985); Stephan, ConstitutionalLimits on
International Rendition of Criminal Suspects, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW:
ENFORCING UNITED STATES LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 43, 45, 52 (R. Lillich ed. 1981);
Comment, Immigration and the First Amendment, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1913 (1985).
139. See Henkin, supra note 138, at 14-15.
140. See Henkin, supra note 138, at 13-19. See also Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 54-58, 66 (1984).
141. E.g., United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
142. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931) (compensation to aliens
for vessels requisitioned by federal government).
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General of the United States sued the Attorney General and other federal
officials. 43 The alien apparently had no connection with the United States
other than that created by the incident in question. The court held that the
lower court erred in dismissing the complaint because, depending on the
contents of the Attorney General's letter, the alien might have had standing
to obtain damages for a violation of rights under the fourth and fifth
amendments. In another case, a court refused to grant summary judgment
for the defendants, United States agents, in an action for damages in which
it was alleged that the agents had forcibly abducted the plaintiff in Panama. '"4
As mentioned earlier, even if an alien has no constitutional right to enter
the United States or to resist deportation from it, this does not mean that
he has no rights at all under the Constitution, especially when the United
States reaches into his homeland and injures him there. Assuming that aliens

abroad have rights under the Constitution, so that, for example, they may
complain that the United States has violated their rights under the first

amendment by some action taken in their country, are their rights the same
as those of United States citizens travelling or residing in that foreign
country?
It may be that in certain circumstances aliens will have more protection
under the Bill of Rights than United States citizens. A United States citizen
can commit treason abroad.

45

His treason may consist simply of speaking,

and the first amendment will give him no protection.' 4 6 The alien abroad,
on the other hand, at least if he is not a resident of the United States and
has no special connection with it,141 cannot commit treason against the United
States because he owes no allegiance to it. He would therefore be protected

143. Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909, 914-17 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
144. Di Lorenzo v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 79, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). It is not stated
in the opinion whether the plaintiff was a United States citizen or an alien, but in finding that
the complaint stated a cause of action, the court did not rely on any allegation of citizenship.
See also In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301, 1308 n.6 (9th Cir. 1982) (nonresident
plaintiffs in wrongful death action had standing to raise question whether limitations on liability
in Warsaw Convention violated fifth amendment). But see Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld,
410 F. Supp. 144, 152-53 (D.D.C. 1976) (no standing for nonresident alien to sue in United
States courts for violation of fourth amendment abroad). See also cases cited in Note, The
Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution-UnalienableRights?, 72 VA. L. REV. 649, 670
n.131 (1986). In Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), the Court held that habeas corpus
petitions of Germans held in an American military prison in Germany who had been convicted
by an American military commission of war crimes for aiding the Japanese against the United
States should be dismissed. The case has sometimes been explained on the ground that the
defendants were enemy aliens and the events took place during war or in its immediate aftermath.
145. Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
146. Id. at 971; Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 937-39 (1st Cir. 1948), cert, denied,
336 U.S. 918 (1949).
147. Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147 (1872) (alien in United States can
commit treason); Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1946) App. Cas. 347 (H.L.) (British
prosecution for treason by American citizen who did propaganda broadcasts from Germany;
defendant had long resided in Britain and held a British passport).
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by the first amendment, assuming he does have rights under the first amendment. Furthermore, a citizen's freedom abroad may be indirectly burdened
in ways that would not be permissible in the case of an alien, at least one
who is not a resident of the United States: for instance, by the obligation
of military service' 48 and by the government's right to tax his property and
49
his income.

Are there situations other than treason in which a citizen abroad will have
less protection than an alien against the direct burdening of constitutional
rights? It might be contended that the status of citizen justifies further
limitations and that it is proper to compel a United States citizen to support
United States policy to an extent that would not be permissible in the case
of an alien. The controls may be directed either to the citizen's leaving the
United States or to his conduct abroad.
Two contrasting hypotheticals having to do with religion bring into focus
this claim of governmental power over citizens. Suppose evangelists who are
United States citizens want to leave the United States and go to Indonesia
to convert people from Islam, Hinduism and other religions existing in that
country to fundamentalist Protestantism. The Indonesian government is
unhappy at this prospect, seeing it as a neocolonialist attack on the culture
of its country and a threat to the political and religious status quo there."10
The United States is concerned too, because it thinks that religious unrest
in Indonesia will have political repercussions, which in turn may cause
international complications. As a result, it denies passports to the evangelists
and even goes so far as to make it illegal for United States citizens to go to
Indonesia for the purpose of making religious conversions.', Here we have
a square conflict between a strong tradition of religious liberty-the right
and duty to carry the Gospel to foreign lands-and respect for the wishes
of the government of another country.
An argument by the evangelists that they have a constitutional right to
leave the United States to spread the Gospel to Indonesia runs up against
formidable although perhaps not insurmountable authority to the contrary.

148. 50 U.S.C. app. § 453(a) (1981). See also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932)
(not violative of fifth amendment to require citizen resident abroad to return to United States
to testify in criminal proceeding and to punish him for contempt for failure to respond to
subpoena).
149. See Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924). See also United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94,
102 (1922).
150. In some parts of the world attempts at religious conversion, at least by certain means,
are illegal. See, e.g., Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977 A.I.R. (S.C.) 908 (India).
151. Even without the latter provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1982) makes it unlawful for a
citizen to leave the United States without a passport except as permitted by the President.
During the 1950s, Mrs. Ruth B. Shipley, Chief of the Passport Division of the State Department, exercised wide powers over the issuance of passports. On one occasion, without giving a
reason, she denied a passport to a Presbyterian clergyman for travel to Japan. N.Y. Times,
May 19, 1952, at 3, col. 1. Bishop C. Bromley Oxnam voiced concern over this action from
the standpoint of the work of the church. N.Y. Times, May 24, 1952, at 20, col. 6.
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In Kent v. Dulles,5 2 decided in 1958, the due process clause of the fifth
amendment was construed to include a right of international travel. Since
the announcement of this right, however, it has been subjected to considerable limitation. The Supreme Court has stated that the right to foreign
travel is weaker than the right to domestic travel' 3 and that it may be
54
curtailed if there is reasonable justification.
The decisions that stand most strongly against the evangelists are Zemel
v. Rusk' and Haig v. Agee.1 6 In Zemel, the Court upheld the Secretary of
State's right to refuse to issue passports for travel to Cuba. The Court
stressed the importance of foreign policy considerations where Cuba was
concerned. Travel of United States citizens to Cuba, the Court thought,
might involve the United States in dangerous incidents and also facilitate the
export of the Cuban Revolution. 51 7 However, in Zemel, the Secretary denied
passports to citizens generally, not to particular persons or groups because
of their beliefs and associations and the ideas they might spread.,
The
Court held that no first amendment right of speech was involved, either
because it thought that travel to Cuba was action not speech, or because,
as it said, the first amendment does not include an "unrestrained right to
gather information." 159
In Haig v. Agee,160 the Court sustained the Secretary of State's revocation
of the passport of a former CIA agent residing abroad who had published
intelligence information, including the names of CIA agents, for the purpose
of disrupting United States intelligence operations. The Court emphasized
the importance of the national security and foreign policy interests involved. 16' Again, as in Zemel, the Court held either that the former agent
was engaged in action, not speech, or that the weight of the national security
and foreign policy interests the government asserted justified a restriction
162
on speech.
If the assertion of any foreign policy or national security interest is enough
to justify a prohibition on travel outside the United States, the right announced in Kent has little significance. If attention is to be paid to the

152. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
153. Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1978). See also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280, 306 (1981).
154. Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 177 (1978); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306
(1981).
155. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
156. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
157. 381 U.S. at 14-15.
158. Id. at 13.
159. Id. at 16-17. See also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (regulations under Trading
With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1982), which prohibited spending money for
travel to Cuba, not violative of fifth amendment).
160. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
161. Id. at 306.
162. Id. at 310.
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weight of the foreign policy and national security interests asserted, then
those put forward in the evangelists' case are perhaps less impressive than
those put forward in Zemel and Agee. Furthermore, whereas in Zemel
passports were not denied because of the beliefs of the applicants, in the
evangelists' case it would be precisely their beliefs and their determination
to spread them in Indonesia that would lead the government to seek to
prevent the evangelists from going there. But in Agee, 63 the Court noted
that it was the content of the former CIA agent's speech that caused the
trouble. The evangelists invoke the free exercise clause as well as the free
speech clause and the fifth amendment. Thus, their case raises the question
whether religious speech is more protected than nonreligious speech under
the first amendment, 64 and, since the free exercise clause is not limited to
speech, it sidesteps the argument that travel is action rather than speech.
I suggest that the right to spread a religious message is so close to the
heart of what the free exercise clause was intended to protect that only
foreign policy considerations of the gravest sort could justify prohibiting the
evangelists from setting out on their mission, and that an idea of citizenship
that requires conformity to national policy in the absence of such consid1 65
erations would be in conflict with the first amendment.
The second hypothetical is the reverse of the first. In this case an American
citizen wishes to go to a foreign country not to change the religion of that
country but to participate in it. He may wish to participate in the religious
culture of the foreign country precisely because it is so different from what
he finds in the United States. 166 For instance, an American Moslem may
wish to go to an Islamic country to participate in a way of life there that
includes some discrimination on the ground of religion and a church-state
system that would be prohibited in the United States. The United States
denies this Moslem citizen a passport and goes on to make it illegal for any
American to engage in religiously discriminatory conduct of certain kinds in

163. Id.
164. Left undecided in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
165. Cf. Ozonoff v. Berzak, 744 F.2d 224 (1st Cir. 1984) (executive order requiring loyalty
check of citizen, including whether he had advocated sedition, as a condition for his holding a
position with the World Health Organization of the United Nations, violates the first amendment).
In 1953, Paul Blanshard sought the revocation of the citizenship of Archbishop Gerald P.
O'Hara, papal nuncio to the Irish Republic, on the ground that the Archbishop was serving a
foreign state in a capacity that required an oath of allegiance to its ruler. See Blanchard, The
Case of Archbishop O'Hara, 70 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 539 (1953). Cf. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387
U.S. 292 (1967) (unconstitutional to deprive of citizenship for voting in foreign election even
though such voting may embarrass United States in its foreign relations).
166. See Alford, Voluntary Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy: The Element of State
Control, 46 VA. L. REV. 477, 489 (1960) (suggesting that gifts made by persons in the United
States, often by will, to persons and entities in foreign countries *sometimes conflict with
American governmental policy because the gifts express the donors' dissatisfaction with conditions in the United States).
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that foreign country. The United States does so because it thinks that the
Islamic country's favoring of Islam creates hostility among other religious
groups, which in turn will have international political consequences, and
also because it wishes to promote "human rights," including religious freedom and the separation of church and state. In this case it is the citizen
who is on the side of the foreign culture and the United States that attacks
it and seeks to prevent the citizen from supporting and participating in it.167
There is an analogy with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,1 61 under which
American companies are forbidden to bribe foreign officials even though
such conduct may not violate the laws or customs of the foreign country.
Again I suggest that what the hypothetical American Moslem wishes to
do is close to the central concern of the free exercise clause and that his
freedom to act in this way should not be overridden except for the gravest
foreign policy considerations. Essentially, the government disagrees with the
religious beliefs that the Moslem citizen has and wishes to put into practice
in the foreign country. The case may seem an appealing one for government
control because the values sought to be enforced are firmly established at
home, but if the ways of the foreign country are not implicitly absolutely
condemned by the Constitution, wherever engaged in-as would be the case
with slavery or torture-but instead are among those ways of other peoples
to which respect is due, there seems no justification for distinguishing between
the alien and the citizen, and while affirming the alien's right in the foreign
country to live in accordance with these customs, prohibiting the citizen
from participating in them as well. In this matter, to compel a citizen to be
a representative of domestic United States values no matter where he goes
is to espouse an idea of citizenship at odds with the emphasis on freedom
in the first and fifth amendments.
If my hypothetical American Moslem has a constitutional right to leave
the United States to participate in a foreign religious system that would be
forbidden at home, does he also have a right to take things of value with
him to support that system, or to send things of value to the foreign country
whether or not he goes himself? Cases have come before American courts
involving gifts by American donors to persons and entities, some of them
religious, in Iron Curtain countries. 69 In these cases, one of the questions
that arose was whether the gift would be intercepted by the foreign government and not reach the intended donee. There was a danger that a court's
answer to this question might be influenced by its attitude toward the foreign

167. Cf. General MacArthur's order in 1945 in occupied Japan divesting the Japanese
government of control of Shintoism and decreeing that henceforth Shintoism would only be
recognized by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers as a religion for those who wished
to accept it. Kotohira Jinsha v. McGrath, 90 F. Supp. 892, 896 (1950).
168. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-2 (1982).
169. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Brizgys v. County Treasurer, 84
N.J. Super. 485, 202 A.2d 709 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964).
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government and the degree of control it exercised over private individuals
and entities. In none of these cases, however, was there brought into the
foreground and subjected to constitutional evaluation the question of the
donor's right to support a foreign system that could not legally exist in the
United States. In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 170 it will be recalled,
the Court held that it violated the free exercise clause to prevent the application of trust property for the support of the Patriarch's appointee in New
York, even though the Patriarch was dominated to a significant extent by
the Soviet government. Would the reasoning of Kedroff also lead to the
conclusion that an American donor must be allowed to support the Patriarch
himself in Moscow, notwithstanding the Patriarch's subordination to the
Soviet government? If there is such a constitutional right, the application of the
Export Administration Act' 7' to religious donations might in certain circumstances be invalid.' 72
In the hypotheticals just discussed, attention has been focused on the
comparative rights of United States citizens and aliens abroad. Now, without
emphasizing this particular question, I wish to examine some additional cases
involving the application of the religion clauses abroad. The first to be
considered has to do with funding by the United States of education in a
foreign country. The second involves employment discrimination based on
religion in a foreign country. My aim is, through an examination of these
cases, to come to a clearer understanding of what should be taken into
account in applying the religion clauses abroad and to lay the foundation

170. 344 U.S. 94 (1952). See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.

171. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20 (1982).
172. Efforts to project American values abroad through enforcement of the Export Administration Act have led to severe conflicts with foreign governments. See, e.g., Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Law: The Case of Export Controls, 132 U. PA. L. REV.

355, 364-66 (1984) (discussing the Soviet pipeline controversy). See also Harris & Bialos, The
Strange New World of United States Export Controls Under the International Emergency

Economic Powers Act, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 71 (1985).
In United States v. Elder Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978), the Export Administration
Act was narrowly construed to prohibit only the export of technical information, and as thus
construed found not to violate the free speech provision of the first amendment. But see Welch
v. Kennedy, 319 F. Supp. 945 (D.D.C. 1970) (prohibition under Trading With the Enemy Act
of Quaker contributing funds to Canadian organization for purpose of sending medical supplies
to noncombatants in North and South Vietnam not violative of free exercise clause).
In Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492 (C.D. Cal. 1986), the court held that
United States Information Agency regulations laying down requirements for obtaining certification of films as "educational, scientific or cultural" violated the right to free speech protected
by the first amendment because they discriminated on the basis of content without being
justified by a sufficiently strong governmental interest. The effect of USIA certification is to
make it possible to obtain exemption from customs duties on importation into foreign countries.
Under a treaty that the USIA regulations seek to implement, signatory foreign countries are
required to give "due consideration" to an exporting country's determination that materials
are educational, scientific or cultural.
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for some concluding general remarks about the matters we have been considering.
The first case, a hypothetical one, involves United States aid to science
education in Malaysia. Assume that the United States provides salary supplements to science teachers in Malaysian secondary schools on condition
that the education provided meets certain standards. The rationale for the
program, so far as the United States is concerned, is that improved science
education will promote economic development, which in turn will contribute
to political and social stability in Malaysia, and stability in Malaysia will
help maintain peace in Southeast Asia. As it happens, the only schools in
Malaysia that meet the standards of the program are schools run by the
government, and these are schools in which the Islamic religion is favored.
There are other schools in Malaysia, some affiliated with religions other
than Islam, but they have poor science programs, partly because of lack of
resources and other disadvantages deriving from the overall social and
political situation. In the government schools, there is instruction in the
Islamic religion and an effort is made to have it permeate the curriculum.
Moslems are preferred in teaching appointments. Non-Moslems are admitted
to the schools; they are not required to take Islamic religious instruction.
Under Lemon v. Kurtzman and its companion cases, 73 and subsequent
cases applying the rules set forth in these decisions,' 74 United States government assistance in the United States to science education in schools of the
sort described would be unconstitutional.1 75 I suggest, however, that it should
not be held unconstitutional for schools of the sort described in Malaysia.
The strength of the United States' foreign policy interest in the stability of
Southeast Asia is great. The aid accords with what the Malaysian government
wants in government schools-a blending of the secular and the religiousand so is supported by the value I have referred to of respect for the ways
of other nations. Although there is a burden on minority religions and those
of no religion in Malaysia, and also on persons in the United States, whose
taxes will be used to support the program, it is not of such severity as to invalid the core freedom protected by the first amendment. It is in this last
aspect that the case differs from the one discussed above involving the
evangelists who want to spread the Gospel in Indonesia.
One can imagine variations on the facts that would argue for a different
result. Suppose the United States supports not science education, but the
teaching of a moderate version of Islam, on the theory that it will provide
a bulwark against both Communism and Iranian-style Islamic fundamentalism. For the United States directly to embrace the doctrines of a particular

173. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
174. E.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
175. The salary supplements would violate the establishment clause because their "primary
effect" would be to aid religion or because they would involve an "excessive entanglement"
of government and religion.
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religion, albeit for political ends, might conflict with the values of the religion
clauses to an extent that cannot be outweighed by foreign policy considerations or the importance of respect for other cultures.
The second situation I offer for consideration involves religious discrimination in employment abroad. Here we have a number of litigated cases. In
thinking about these cases, it is interesting to recall those discussed earlier
involving foreign companies discriminating in employment in the United
States.
Suppose the United States operates a facility in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi
Arabian government insists that only Moslems be employed at this facility
and the United States has acquiesced in this requirement. The United States
justifies its acquiescence on the ground that the facility is vital to the defense
of Saudi Arabia and the United States, and also on the ground that it is
right thus to accommodate to a foreign religious culture. Difficult problems
of classification are avoided because the Saudis are satisfied with a simple
written statement by each employee that he is a Moslem. Assume the United
States hires both United States citizens and aliens for work at the facility,
and it enters into contracts of employment both in the United States and
176
abroad. The aim is to get qualified people for the job who are also Moslems.

176. In 1956, Secretary of State Dulles revealed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that Saudi Arabia did not allow servicemen of the Jewish faith to be stationed at the United
States Air Force base in Dhahran. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1956, at 3, col. 4, and Feb. 26, 1956,
at 33, col. 4. Controversy over this matter continued until 1962, when Saudi Arabia refused to
renew the lease for the base and it was closed. N.Y. Times, April 23, 1962, at 28, col. 5. The
controversy over the base at Dhahran recalled an earlier controversy between the United States
and Russia. In the 1880s, Russian consular officials in New York were instructed not to issue
visas to Jews, or at least certain categories of Jews, for visits to Russia. In spite of repeated
protests from the United States, the Russian government refused to change its policy. Finally,
in 1911, as a result of the controversy, the United States terminated its treaty of commerce
and navigation with Russia. 37 Stat. 627 (1911). During the course of the controversy, our
minister in St. Petersburg wrote to a Russian official:
Thus, you see [from the first amendment], my Government is prohibited in the
most positive manner possible by the very law of its existence from even attempting
to put any form of limitation upon any of its citizens by reason of his religious
belief. How, then, can we permit this to be done by others? To say that they can
thereby be discriminated against by foreign governments, and are only safeguarded
against their own, would be a remarkable position for us to occupy.
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Transmitted to Congress Dec.
2, 1895. Pt. II, p. 1064 (1896).
Prince Lobanow, the Russian foreign minister, responded:
As to the American Constitution, I must confess that it seems to me to be here
beside the question. The article of the Constitution which you are good enough to
mention, and which prescribes that no religion is prohibited in the United States,
is, by the very nature of things, placed outside of all prejudice by the consular
authority. He has neither to prohibit nor authorize the exercise in America of any
cult; and the fact of his vis6 being accorded or refused does not encroach upon the
article in question. The refusal of the vis6 is not at all an attack upon any established
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The program is objected to by non-Moslems in the United States and
abroad who feel humiliated by the religious restriction and angry at being
excluded from profitable employment, and by United States taxpayers who
object to their money being spent to support a religiously discriminatory
program. In response to pressure, the United States government modifies
the program so that only aliens not residing in the United States are hired,
and all contracts of employment are made abroad. The result is that the
program is deprived of a number of qualified personnel. The program as
modified is in accord with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which excepts
out of its general prohibition against religious discrimination in government
77
employment "aliens employed outside the limits of the United States."'1
I suggest that even as unmodified the program is constitutional. The
national security interest is great, and the value of respect for another culture
is present. This latter value includes the interest of Moslems who live in the
United States who may wish to go to Saudi Arabia to participate in its
Islamic way of life. The sparse information provided does not show that the
consequences to those of other religions or of none, either in the United
States or in Saudi Arabia, are of such severity as to implicate the core value
of religious freedom in the first amendment. The program as modified
should certainly not be struck down.
Discrimination on religious grounds in private employment abroad is the
subject of interesting recent cases. The Constitution, of course, imposes no
prohibition against religious discrimination in private employment. There
can be no doubt, however, of Congress's power to prohibit such discrimination to some extent. But at a certain point the exercise of this power
conflicts with a right to live in accordance with one's own beliefs, even if
they are out of step with the tolerant spirit that generally prevails in the
United States."78 When the employment in question is in a foreign country,
the argument in favor of this right is especially strong.
9
In Kern v. Dynalectron,"7
a company incorporated in Delaware hired the
plaintiff in Fort Worth to fly helicopters in Saudi Arabia. The job was to
fly over a pilgrimage route to Mecca and drop down when necessary to
disembark personnel who would fight fires and suppress disorder among the

religion; it is the consequence of a foreign law of an administrative character, which
only has its effect outside of the territory of the Union.
Id. at 1065. For an account of the controversy, see N.Y. Times, July 2, 1911, § 5, at 1, col. 1.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982).
178. See the opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2155 n.16
(1986), observing that although in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), it
was decided that it did not violate the free exercise clause to withdraw tax exemption from a
private university that, on the basis of religious belief, practiced racial discrimination in
admissions, the case did not decide whether a criminal penalty could be imposed, and that,
quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 463 (1973), "the Constitution may compel

toleration of private discrimination in some circumstances."
179. 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 810 (1984).
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pilgrims. Saudi Arabian law made the presence of a non-Moslem in the
region of Mecca a crime: the punishment-beheading. The company made
it clear to the plaintiff that a condition of employment was that he be a
Moslem, and it provided a course in Tokyo in the Islamic religion to help
him meet this condition. The plaintiff, a Baptist, accepted the offer and
went to Tokyo. He took the course, chose an Islamic name and signed a
certificate of conversion. Then, apparently, he had second thoughts, and
instead of going on to Mecca returned to Texas and filed suit under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. 80 The district court held that the company had
not violated Title VII because being a Moslem was a "bona fide occupational
qualification" for the job, an exception provided in the statute. 8 ' The court
stressed the risk to the company's business and to its pilots of using nonMoslem pilots.1 s2 But of course its decision implicitly attached importance

to the company's continuing to do business in Saudi Arabia. Arguably, if
the court had reached the opposite result under the statute and found it
prohibited requiring the pilots to be Moslems, the statute would conflict
with -the first amendment. At stake would be the religious interest of the
Saudis, which I have suggested ought to receive constitutional recognition,
and the interest of those Americans who want to participate in the religious
culture of Saudi Arabia.
Suppose a pilgrimage similar to that in Kern took place in the United
States, say to a sacred site in eastern Oregon. The organizers of the pilgrimage
also apprehend a danger of disorder among the pilgrims and decide to deal
with it in the same way as the Saudis-by patrolling with helicopters. And,
like the Saudis, they want the helicopter pilots to be of their own faith, in
order to safeguard the religious character of the pilgrimage. Possibly the
courts will hold that the organizers of the Oregon pilgrimage may not require
the helicopter pilots to be of their faith, on the ground that Title VII forbids
it and the Constitution does not invalidate the prohibition. This result may
be supported by the argument that the importance of preserving the religious
character of the pilgrimage is outweighed by the importance of not excluding

180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
181. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982), it is not an unlawful employment practice to
discriminate on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin when religion, sex, or national
origin is "a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of that particular business or enterprise."
It may also be noted that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1982) makes the prohibitions of Title VII
inapplicable to an employer "with respect to the employment of aliens outside any state." For
a discussion of whether Title VII should be interpreted to apply abroad to employees who are
United States citizens, see Kirschner, The Extraterritorial Applications of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act, 34 LAB. L.J. 394 (1983). For a survey of the extraterritorial application of numerous
other United States laws relating to labor, including the Fair Labor Standards Act, see Goldberg,
Labor Relations and Labor Standards for Employees of United States Enterprises Working in
Foreign Areas, 48 N.D.L. REv. 23 (1971-72).

182. 577 F. Supp. at 1200.

DEPA UL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1

from jobs of this sort, which from one point of view at least are secular,
those of other faiths or of no faith.' s3 I suggest, however, that the result
may be different in Saudi Arabia. The foreign location of the pilgrimage
adds strength to the claim of respect for another culture. If the pilgrimage
in Oregon is an American Indian pilgrimage, on the other hand, rather than
one organized, say, by Hindus, an interesting middle case is presented,
because, as we know, an Indian tribe is a nation, albeit a domestic, dependent
nation.
In another foreign private employment case,8 4 the result was the opposite
of that in Kern. The Baylor College of Medicine in Houston had a contract
with the Saudi Arabian government to send cardiac surgical teams to the
King Faisal Hospital in Riyadh. This was an extremely lucrative assignment
for the doctors involved, and it also gave them medical experience not
available in the United States. Those designated for the program were
provided with visa forms that asked for their religious preference and they
were required to state a preference. Baylor administrators in charge of the
program excluded Jews. They did so not because of any express agreement
with the Saudis, but because they had formed the view that the Saudis did
not want Jews. The court held that Title VII had been violated because
"Baylor has not established any bona fide justification for excluding Jews
' 85
from the .. .program.'
The Baylor case perhaps can be distinguished from Kern. In Baylor, the
Saudi attitude was not clear. If when pressed the Saudis would not have
insisted on the exclusion of Jews, that would have eliminated the argument
about respecting the ways of a foreign country. Furthermore, the Baylor
case perhaps did not involve religious discrimination: the Saudi objection
might not have been religious, but racial or political, and so arguably entitled
to less respect under Title VII and the Constitution.8 6 On the other hand,

183. Title VII contains an exemption for the activities of religious organizations from the
prohibition against religious discrimination in employment. The statute provides: "This subchapter shall not apply .. .to a religious corporation, association, educational institution or
society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or
society of its activities." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1982). In Corporation of Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987), the Court held that the exemption covers the secular as well as
the religious activities of religious organizations and that, at least as applied to the nonprofit
activities of these organizations, it does not violate the establishment clause. The plaintiff in
the Amos case was a building engineer in a gymnasium owned and operated by corporations
associated with the Mormon Church. He was discharged from his position because he failed to
qualify for a "temple recommend," a status awarded only to those who meet certain church
standards.
184. Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986).
185. Id. at 535.
186. Cf. St. Francis College v. Majid Ghaiden AI-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987); Shaare
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987) (discrimination against a person because
he is a Jew or Arab is discrimination on the ground of ancestry or ethnic characteristics, which
is racial discrimination within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982).
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it is not possible to distinguish the Baylor case from Kern on the ground
that it is less important to maintain an atmosphere of faith in a hospital
than on a pilgrimage route. Such a distinction would have the courts deciding
what ought to be important in religion. From a secular point of view, there
is no more value in keeping open to those of all faiths or of none the job
of a cardiac surgeon than the job of a helicopter pilot. 18 7
CONCLUSION

Clearly we need to explore further this question of the religion clauses in
foreign countries. I have made here only a beginning. Additional cases will
be helpful in bringing the relevant considerations more clearly into view,
and in time we will have them. Still, I may have said enough to justify a
tentative general statement. In fact, I have already intimated a theory at
several points in the discussion. Essentially my suggestion is this: there should
be found implicit in the Constitution recognition of the importance of respect
for the ways of foreign nations. What is a rule for government in the United
States with its special history aid present circumstances is not necessarily a
rule for the government of the United States acting in other places, which
have their own histories and conditions. The distinction is not arbitrary, but
derives from the philosophy of the Constitution itself and its ideas about
human nature and the good for man. What is the good for man is conditioned
to some extent by the history and circumstances of peoples. Efforts to apply
the religion clauses especially compel recognition of this truth, for it is when
we confront the religious element in another culture that we are most likely
to see the importance of allowing others to follow their own ways. The
rhetoric of human rights, at least as applied to the religious issue, tends to
obscure this truth. Still, within the first amendment there is an irreducible
core that will not accommodate, that claims universal validity. This irreducible core is as much a product of the philosophy of the Constitution as is
a generous tolerance of other cultures. It is based upon the belief that if
ideological expression through political institutions is carried beyond a certain
point, it will eliminate processes in individuals and groups that are indispensable for achieving the human good. That we are not exactly clear what is
universal and what is relative in the first amendment is due to the fact that
we are not clear about the philosophy that underlies it. But this can come
as no surprise since we are constantly confronted with the same uncertainty
in domestic church-state cases as we attempt to determine what government
must maintain without qualification and how much room it must leave for
the expression of beliefs in conflict with constitutional truths.
I have stressed the possibility of finding within the first amendment
187. See also In re American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 9 N.Y.2d 223, 173 N.E.2d 788
(1961) (finding erroneous a determination by the New York Commission Against Discrimination
that there was not probable cause to process a complaint against an oil company doing business
in Saudi Arabia which alleged that the company was violating a state statute by inquiring into
the religion of job applicants in New York).
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recognition of the value of respect for the ways of others, especially of
foreign nations. I have stressed this because it seems to me not sufficiently
noticed. But this emphasis may have left the impression that the reason for
believing that the religion clauses have a different application in different
cultural settings is simply so that others may be free to follow their own
ways. I would conclude, however, on a more affirmative note: It is possibly
to our interest that societies with ideas quite different from our own,
including ideas about the proper relation between government and religion,
should exist. For the answers we have for ourselves are not so certainly
correct that we can afford to be without the light that comes from other
very different ways.

